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Abstract. BIP70 is the Bitcoin payment protocol for communication
between a merchant and a pseudonymous customer. McCorry et al.
(FC 2016) showed that BIP70 is prone to refund attacks and proposed
a fix that requires the customer to sign their refund request. They ar-
gued that this minimal change will provide resistance against refund
attacks. In this paper, we point out the drawbacks of McCorry et al.’s
fix and propose a new approach for protection against refund attacks
using the Bitcoin multisignature mechanism. Our solution does not rely
on merchants storing refund requests, and unlike the previous solution,
allows updating refund addresses through email. We discuss the security
of our proposed method and compare it with the previous solution. We
also propose a novel application of our refund mechanism in providing
anonymity for payments between a payer and payee in which merchants
act as mixing servers. We finally discuss how to combine the above two
mechanisms in a single payment protocol to have an anonymous payment
protocol secure against refund attacks.
1 Introduction
Since the introduction of Bitcoin in 2008 [14], it has been widely adopted by
merchants as a payment method. By 2015, the number of merchants accept-
ing Bitcoin was reported to surpass 100,000 [8] and it has continued to expand
into new markets (see e.g. [10,9]). Bitcoin standards are developed through a
process which involves a so-called (Standard Track) Bitcoin Improvements Pro-
posal (BIP) being proposed, discussed, ratified, and adopted by the Bitcoin
community. BIP70 [1] is the Bitcoin Payment Protocol standard that defines
the communications between a pseudonymous customer and a merchant with a
public key certificate. The protocol, provides a number of properties to improve
the interaction between the two entities (e.g. allows the merchant’s address to
be human-readable) and also provides the necessary guarantees (e.g. a proof of
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payment to the customer that can be used for dispute resolution). One impor-
tant feature of the protocol is that the customer can specify refund addresses
that will be used by the merchant in the case of refunds for cancelled orders or
overpayments.
McCorry, Shahandashti and Hao however showed two refund attacks on the
BIP70 protocol [13]. These attacks are referred to as the Silkroad Trader and
Marketplace Trader attacks, and exploit the inadequacies of the refund mech-
anism in the standard, including for example the fact that the protocol only
provides one-way authentication. In the Silkroad Trader attack, a malicious cus-
tomer uses the refund mechanism to relay a payment to an illicit merchant (the
Silkroad Trader) through an honest merchant. This is by simply declaring the
Bitcoin address of the Silkroad Trader as the refund address, and later asking for
a refund. McCorry et al. [13] discuss the steps required for the attack in detail
and showed its feasibility by successfully carrying out the attack in real-life pay-
ment scenarios. The authors also described a second attack, called Marketplace
Trader attack, in which a rogue trader plays the role of a Man-in-the-Middle
(MITM) between the customer and a reputable merchant and effectively direct
the customer’s payment to its own address after using the inadequate authen-
tication of the protocol to change the refund address. In both these attacks,
the analysis of blockchain data will not reveal the attacks. In McCorry et al.’s
solution the customer signs the refund addresses by the public key they have
used in the payment (the signature is called a proof of endorsement) and so
effectively binds the refund addresses to the customer address. This prevents
the first attack since the customer cannot deny their link to the Silkroad trader
anymore. McCorry et al. [13] argue that this measure also discourages the second
attack since merchants will become more reluctant to update the refund address
through unauthenticated channels such as email.
McCorry et al.’s solution, although minimally changing the protocol, intro-
duces a major data management challenge for the merchant. This is because
protection against the Silkroad trader attack requires the merchant to main-
tain a database of the proofs of endorsement and transactions that are signed
by the customer. These transactions include the refund information including
the amount and the refundee address that the merchant must use, and the
amount and address of the customer that the merchant has received the bitcoins
from. Using the stored data, the merchant can “prove” that they have followed
the customer’s request and have not colluded with the customer in transferring
money to the refundee (Silkroad Trader). We refer to this as an explicit log solu-
tion where all the relevant information must be stored and kept indefinitely by
the merchant. The stored data are also privacy sensitive and so the merchant
must adopt extra measures to secure the storage. The data must be kept in the
database indefinitely as proof may become necessary at any time in the future.
The database must be securely backed up (e.g. using cloud services) to ensure
data is available when required.
Our contributions. We introduce implict logging that requires the merchant
to only store a number of indexes to the blockchain that will be used to recover
the required proof of innocence, when needed. The solution works as follows:
a refund operation consists of two transactions produced by the merchant. The
first transaction is a two output transaction with the refund amount that requires
the signatures of the refundee and the customer to release the fund. The second
transaction has the same value and is issued to the customer, with a time lock
that allows the transaction to be released only after a specified time passes. The
refundee requires the signature of the customer to receive their refund, which
implies that they endorse the refund. If the customer does not endorse the refund
(e.g. in the case of a Marketplace Trader attack), the first transaction will not
be redeemed in time and hence the customer will be able to use the second
(time-locked) transaction to redeem the bitcoins.
The merchant will store the indexes of the two transactions that are issued for
a refund request, together with the indexes of the original payment transaction
and the redeemed transaction. In the case of multiple refundees, all their details
will be included in the first transaction and so the same amount of storage will
be required.
The solution is robust in the sense that transactions that are associated
with a refund and contain the proof of the relation between the customer and
the refundee are kept on the blockchain and are immutable. If the database
that contains the indexes of the transactions is corrupted, the merchant can
still recover the information about the transactions that they have issued or
received, by searching the blockchain for transactions that include their public
key information. The solution preserves the privacy of the refund transaction
against an adversary who has access to the blockchain and eavesdrops on the
communication between the customer and the merchant, in the sense that the
linkage between the customer and the refundee can only be revealed by the
customer or the merchant. We will discuss how the scheme can be modified when
there are more than one transaction issuers (this was considered by McCorry et
al.). The details of this solution is given in Section 3.
We show that this solution also provides protection against Marketplace
Trader attack without putting any restriction on BIP70. This is in contrast
with McCorry et al.’s solution that requires the refund address not be accepted
through email. This restriction is likely to be ignored in practice, rendering Mc-
Corry et al.’s solution icapable of preventing Marketplace Trader attacks.
In section 4 we consider a novel application of the refund mechanism in pro-
viding payment anonymity. The main observation is that refund addresses in
Bitcoin can effectively provide a level of indirection that if carefully used, can
decouple the payer and payee. In our proposal, the merchant provides a mix-
ing service that allows the customers to pay for other services and to other
merchants using a combination of overpayment and refund. By “mixing” trans-
actions of multiple customers, the linkage of transactions using their payer and
payee fields, as well as values, will be removed. We define the communication
protocol between the customer and the mixing service based on BIP70. Finally,
in Appendix A we discuss how the above two mechanisms can be combined to
provide an anonymous payment protocol with security against refund attacks.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The BIP70 Payment Protocol
BIP70 [1] is a Bitcoin application layer payment protocol that defines the se-
quence of messages communicated between a customer and a merchant. BIP70
consists of three messages: payment request, payment, and payment acknowledg-
ment. It proceeds as follows.
After the customer selects an item from the merchant’s website and clicks to
pay, the merchant responds by sending a payment request message. This message
contains payment details, the information related to merchant’s X.509 certificate
(PKI type and PKI data), as well as the signature of the merchant on the hash of
the payment request. Here payment details consists of the Bitcoin address that
the customer should send the bitcoins to, the time that request has been created,
an expiration time, a memo containing notes to the customer, a payment URL,
and finally the merchant data which is used by the merchant to identify the
payment request.
The customer’s Bitcoin wallet subsequently verifies the signature and the
merchant’s identity, the information in the payment details, such as the time of
the request creation and expiry, displays the merchant’s identity, the amount to
pay, and the memo to the customer and asks the customer whether they want to
continue. If confirmed, the wallet will create the necessary Bitcoin transactions
for the payment and broadcast them to the Bitcoin peer-to-peer (P2P) network.
Then, a payment message is sent to the merchant. This message consists of the
merchant data from the payment details in payment request, one or more valid
Bitcoin transactions, the refund to field which specifies a set of refund amount
and address pairs to be used in case of a refund request, and a note for the
merchant (memo).
When the merchant receives the payment message, it verifies that the trans-
actions satisfy the payment conditions, broadcasts the transactions, and sends
back a payment acknowledgment message. This message contains a copy of the
payment message and a final memo including a note on the status of the trans-
action.
BIP70 does not specify how the payment request message should be down-
loaded, but requires that the payment and payment acknowledgment messages
are communicated over a secure channel (such as HTTPS).
BIP70 does not explicitly define a refund protocol. It is implicitly assumed
that if the customer requests a refund identifying the payment by the merchant
data field, the merchant issues a refund transaction which sends the refund
amounts to the corresponding refund addresses specified in the refund to field of
the payment message.
Figure 1 shows the communication flow in BIP70 and its implicit refund
procedure. Note that besides communicating with each other, both the customer
and the merchant are assumed have access to the Bitcoin P2P network. Both
are able to broadcast transactions to the Bitcoin P2P network. Upon receiving a
transaction, the Bitcoin P2P network decides whether to add the transaction into
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Fig. 1. The BIP70 payment protocol and its refund procedure. Note that the Bitcoin
P2P network to which the transactions are broadcast is not explicitly shown here.
the distributed ledger (i.e. the Bitcoin blockchain) through the Bitcoin consensus
mechanism. Both the customer and the merchant are also able to check whether
their broadcasted transaction has been included in the blockchain. It is important
to distinguish the communications in the application layer payment protocol and
those in the P2P network. To simplify our diagrams, we do not explicitly show
the P2P network communications.
2.2 Refund Attacks
McCorry et al. propose two attacks on the refund process of BIP70 [13]. These
attacks work even if a secure channel such as HTTPS is used for communication
between parties. We briefly describe these two attacks in the following.
Silkroad Trader attack. The refund addresses provided by the customer (in
the refund to field) are in no way endorsed and can be repudiated at a later time.
This means that a malicious customer may abuse the refund mechanism to relay
their payment to an illicit trader (here called the Silkroad trader) through an
honest merchant. The customer simply provides the illicit trader’s address as
the refund address to the merchant and thus when a refund is requested, the
merchant will send the refund to the illicit Trader. The customer can later deny
abusing the refund mechanism and the merchant will have no way to prove they
have been cheated. Figure 2 shows the interaction among parties in this attack.
Marketplace Trader attack. Some merchants allow customers to specify new
refund addresses upon a refund request. The customer requesting the refund
is not authenticated. This means that any entity who has knowledge of the
payment identifier (specified in the merchant data field of the payment details
Customer Merchant
PaymentRequest2
Payment2: { …, refund_to = pay_toST , … }
PaymentAck2
Broadcast Tx
Broadcast Tx
Refund Request
Broadcast 
RefundTx
Silkroad Trader
PaymentRequest1: { …, { pay_toST , … }, … } 
Payment1: { …, transactions = RefundTx, … }
PaymentAck1
Fig. 2. The Silkroad Trader attack.
in the payment request message) can request a refund to any arbitrary account.
This is the basis for the Marketplace Trader attack, in which a rogue trader
acts as relaying man-in-the-middle for the payment request message between the
merchant and the customer. Hence, the rogue trader is able to find out merchant
data. At a later time, the rogue trader requests a refund to an arbitrary address
and is able to steal the funds. Figure 3 shows the interactions among the parties
in this attack.
2.3 McCorry et al.’s Solution to Refund Attacks
McCorry et al. propose to include in the payment message a “proof of endorse-
ment” for refund addresses. To do this, each customer address involved in the
payment protocol is required to produce a digital signature on (and therefore
“endorse”) a corresponding refund address. Employing this solution, at the end
of a successful payment protocol, the merchant will be in possession of a proof of
endorsement for each refund address. Such a proof can be presented and verified
by a third party in case of a Silkroad Trader attack to implicate the malicious
customer. Besides, since such a proof of endorsement is valuable for merchants,
McCorry et al. argue that it will discourage merchants to accept new refund
addresses unless accompanied by a proof of endorsement, resulting in reducing
the possibility of Marketplace Trader attacks.
In McCorry et al.’s solution, for guaranteed protection against attacks, mer-
chants will need to store payment transactions as well as payment requests and
payment messages which are required to verify the proof of endorsement. There-
fore, the actual storage overhead of McCorry et al.’s solution is much larger than
only keeping proofs of endorsement. As noted earlier, maintaining a secure and
robust database to store proof of endorsement messages is a security bottleneck
Rogue Trader Merchant
PaymentRequest: {…, { merchant_data }, …}
Payment
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Fig. 3. The Marketplace Trader attack.
of the system and can particularly become expensive for smaller merchants with
limited resources.
2.4 Multisignature and Time-Locked Transactions in Bitcoin
Although it is convenient to think of Bitcoin transactions as sending funds to
certain account addresses, technically what the transaction specifies is a set of
redemption criteria in a certain script language. Any subsequent transaction
which satisfies the redemption criteria may authorize the transfer of funds made
available in the original transaction.
The most popular script is “Pay to Public Key Hash” (P2PKH), which re-
quires a signature corresponding to an address, hence effectively sending the
bitcoins to the address. Typical Bitcoin transactions use this script.
Another popular and more versatile script is “Pay to Script Hash” (P2SH),
which requires satisfying a script, the hash of which is listed. P2SH can be used to
implement a diverse range of transactions including multisignature transactions.
A k-of-n multisignature transaction requires k signatures corresponding to k
addresses within a set of n specified addresses to be present to redeem the funds
in the transaction.
An interesting script which can be combined with the ones discussed above
is one that effectively freezes the transaction funds until a time in the future to
create a so-called time-locked transaction. The funds in a time-locked transaction
cannot be spent by any other transaction until a certain (absolute or relative)
time in the future.
3 A New Approach to Protection against Refund Attacks
We propose a solution to refund attacks that requires the merchant to store a
fixed number of indexes (and so constant size) in each run of BIP70 protocol.
The solution is robust to possible damages to database content, and ensures
privacy of refund transaction from outsiders.
BIP70 requires the payment and payment acknowledgment to be sent over
a secure channel, however does not specify such a requirement for the payment
request message [1]. Therefore, in general we consider two types of attackers:
– Online attacker, intercepts the communication channel and sees all the
input/output messages of a merchant; they also have access to blockchain
data.
– Offline attacker, has only access to the blockchain data.
To simplify our description, we first assume BIP70 communication is over
HTTPS and so we only need to consider an offline attacker. We then show how
to secure the protocol against an online attacker.
Our goal is to provide the following properties for the refund mechanism:
Implicit log. The merchant only stores indexes of transactions in a protocol
run. This has the following advantages:
– Constant storage size per protocol run. The local storage size for
a customer’s payment in a protocol run is constant.
– Robustness. The refund mechanism will work correctly and reliably in
the case of a dispute, even if the merchant’s local database is corrupted
or lost. In the worst case when none of the locally stored indexes are
accessible, the merchant can recover the required proofs by searching
the blockchain using their own public key information.
Refund privacy. An offline adversary with access to the blockchain, or an
online adversary with access to the blockchain and the communication link
between the merchant and the customer, cannot reveal the linkage between
the customer and the refundee. Note that BIP70 does not require secure
communication between the customer and the merchant and so an online
adversary can access unencrypted communication between the two. We note
that the merchant’s local database must be kept secure for customers’ pri-
vacy.
We also aim to conform with BIP70 specifications and avoid extra restrictions
including not accepting refund addresses by email. Note that Refund addresses
are valid for two months from the time of the payment [1], and during this period
the customer should be allowed to change the refund addresses for example when
an existing refundee has lost their wallet. Coinbase and Bitpay [7,6] both accept
refund address updates via email.
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Fig. 4. (a) The main transaction. (b) The proposed Refund mechanism, in which mer-
chant locks the transaction to the customer and the refundee and they may redeem this
transaction if they collaborate. The merchant also issues RefundTC2 for robustness to
ensure that the refund can be unlocked by customer in case the first transaction is not
redeemed.
3.1 Our Solution
Our proposed refund mechanism works as follows. The merchant creates a 2-of-
2 multisignature transaction, and hence binds the refund amount to both the
customer and refundee. Then, to make the protocol robust in case one of the ad-
dresses is not available, a second transaction is created. This second transaction
is a time-locked transaction, and the customer is its only recipient. Merchant
uses a lock time for this transaction to give priority to the first transaction. If
the customer and the refundee could not collaborate to redeem the refund, the
customer is able to claim them after the lock time. Note that the lock time cre-
ates a delay in the system only if the customer does not know the refundee, e.g. in
the case of a Marketplace Trader attack. In other words, the second transaction
is a backup for system robustness (see Figure 4).
In addition, to preserve refund privacy against offline attackers3 the mer-
chant deterministically creates fresh addresses from the public key of the cus-
tomer and then masks them with a Diffie-Hellman key, generated using the fresh
address of the customer and the private key of the merchant. This is to ensure
that only the merchant or the customer who are able to re-generate the Diffie-
Hellman key can discover the linkage between the refund key and the payment
transaction. To derive fresh addresses we assume the customer has a determinis-
tic wallet based on BIP32 [18]. Most Bitcoin wallets support BIP32 and so this
is a reasonable assumption. In the rest of the paper, by deterministic wallet we
3 Bitcoin transactions use fresh addresses (address freshness) [4] to protect the privacy
of the address owner as well as others.
mean a BIP32 wallet with a master key and key hierarchy (keys can be specified
with an index).
Based on BIP32, a deterministic wallet generates a tree of public/private
key pairs on elliptic curve E, e.g. for a 1-level tree, it creates 231 hardened and
231 non-hardened keys. Hardened keys are public keys for which the associated
private keys can only be known before the generation of the public key. Non-
hardened keys however allow anyone to derive a valid child public key from
the parent public key, while the owner of the parent (master) private key can
generate the respective child private key. In our protocol, the customer address
in the payment transaction is a non-hardened public key which is used as a
parent key by the merchant to derive child public keys. The customer knows the
respective private keys and can also create the Diffie-Hellman key using the child
private key and the public key of the merchant. Hardened keys can be used for
refund addresses. The step by step process is given below:
Key generation. The customer wallet software generates a tree of public/private
key pairs using BIP32 [18]. Each private key is an element of Fq, where
q = pn is a prime power. Each public key is a point on an elliptic curve E
(specified for bitcoin) over Fq. Hl denotes the 256 leftmost bits of HMAC-
SHA512 which is used for computing the child key; the rightmost bits of
HMAC-SHA512 are used as the next level chain code. Let Pkc = cP be a
non-hardened public key. A child public key can be derived by anyone using
this parent public key as follows: Pk′c = Pkc +Hl(chc, Pkc||index)P ; where
Pk′c is a child public key, Pk
′
c = c
′P , but only the customer who knows
the parent private key can compute the child private key c′. chc denotes the
chain code which is the 256 rightmost side of the parent hash, and index
is the index of the generated child key in the tree. (Pkc, chc) is called the
extended pubic key (see [18] for details). We also use H∗ to denote a colli-
sion resistant hash function which maps a point on Elliptic curve E to Fq,
this is used for computing the Diffie-Hellman component in child keys as we
describe it below.
Click to pay. The customer visits the merchant website and chooses an item,
then declares their intent to pay (e.g. by clicking a “pay” button).
Payment request. The merchant sends the payment request including their
public key, Pkm = mP . This public key is unique for each transaction.
Payment message. The customer after authenticating the merchant, puts to-
gether a payment transaction, MainTC, that transfers the cost of the chosen
item to the merchant, and uses a non-hardened extended public key (with
external chain) (Pkc = cP, chc), as a data output (using the OP Return op-
code). Finally, the customer creates a Payment message based on MainTC,
and specifies their extended public key, n refund addresses, (Pkr1 , Pkr2 ,
. . . , Pkrn), and the amount of refund for each address.
Payment ack. The merchant detects MainTC, and returns a PaymentAck mes-
sage to the customer.
Refund request. Within a 2 month period from the payment request [1], the
customer can use the addresses provided in Payment.refund to field to receive
their refund. In this case, the merchant does the following:
1. Generates two new keys, Pkm1 = m1P and Pkm2 = m2P .
2. Derives child keys from the customer extended public key as described
earlier, Pk′ci for 1 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1.
3. Masks the child keys as Pk′′ci = Pk
′
ci +H
∗(m1Pk′ci)P for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and
Pk′′ci = Pk
′
ci +H
∗(m2Pk′ci)P for i = n+ 1.
4. Creates and broadcasts two transactions, RefundTC1 (in which the mer-
chant’s public key is Pkm1) and RefundTC2 (in which the merchant’s
public key is Pkm2). RefundTC1 is a P2SH transaction that can be re-
deemed by providing signatures from both Pk′′ci and Pkri for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
RefundTC2 is a P2PKH transaction that can be redeemed by the private
key corresponding to Pk′′cn+1 after a specified lock time period (e.g. one
week).
3.2 Protection against Silkroad Trader Attacks
In the Silkroad Trader attack, the customer wants to remove their link to the
Silkroad Trader using a victim merchant. In our approach the refund transac-
tion can be only redeemed if the customer and the refundee collaborate. Hence,
the redemption of the refund transaction constitutes an evidence of the linkage
between the customer and the refundee. This linkage, however, is hidden from
those who observe the Bitcoin blockchain and so the merchant is the only one
who knows this linkage. The merchant can prove that a payment transaction and
a refund transaction are linked to each other by first deriving the child keys from
the payment transactions and adding the respective Diffie-Hellman key (based
on the public key of the merchant and the customer’s child key) to them, then
using the refundees’ public key and the customer’s masked child keys to create
the P2SH address and show that it matches the address within the refund trans-
action; finally showing that the refund transaction has been redeemed by a pair
of collaborating customer and refundee, thus establishing the evidence of the
linkage. The merchant does not need to store the transactions in their database
and the proofs are robustly preserved on the blockchain.
3.3 Protection against Marketplace Trader Attacks
If the customer provides a refund address during the BIP70 protocol run and
later update it via email, the merchant just uses the newest refund address and
locks the refund amount to both the refundee and the customer. If the customer
and the refundee collaborate to redeem the refund, the refund is finalized; oth-
erwise, if the rogue trader sends their own address to the merchant, they cannot
later claim the bitcoins since the customer will not collaborate with an unknown
refundee to sign the refund transaction. In case of such an attack, the customer
will be able to claim the refund after the lock time expires. Thus, the approach
protects the customer against Marketplace Trader attacks and at the same time
provides the possibility to update the refund addresses.
3.4 Communication over HTTP
BIP70 does not restrict the customer and merchant to use HTTPS. Our pro-
posed solution to refund attacks although by design hide the relation between
the customer and the merchant, payment messages include information such as
the refundee’s address which can be used by an online attacker to find the cor-
responding refund transactions by searching the blockchain for the transactions
that contain the address and so trace refundees transactions. To protect against
these attacks, the customer may use HTTPS, or Diffie-Hellman key agreement
on the merchant’s public key and their own private key, to generate a key that
will be used to encrypt sensitive messages such that they are decryptable by the
merchant. Alternatively, merchant can follow the key generation algorithm of
our scheme for both customers and refundees (for refundees derive child keys of
the refund addresses and then mask them with Diffie-Hellman key on the refun-
dees child key and their own private key). In this case refundee can still find the
corresponding private key to claim the refund, but attacker cannot detect the
refund transactions.
3.5 Analysis
In the following, we show how each of the mentioned properties will be satisfied.
Implicit logging. A merchant may store information that are communicated
during a payment protocol for various reasons, including bookkeeping, refund or
exchange, or statistics about customers and products. Here we do not consider
bookkeeping that is mainly for accounting purposes or the ability to honour
refund or exchange policies. Nor we consider data storage that are for statistical
analysis purposes. As noted in [13], using the Bitcoin Payment Protocol requires
the merchant to store evidence to protect them against refund attacks. This
information must be kept for a sufficiently long time to be effective in providing
such protection.
Consider a single run of the payment protocol. Transactions which are the
“evidence for innocence” (of the merchant) are stored on the blockchain. The
merchant must just store the transaction indexes, that is, the transaction ids
(txid) of the MainTC, both the refund transactions RefundTC1 and RefundTC2,
and Redeem transaction by which the customer (and possibly the refundee) re-
deem the refund. Table 1 shows a full refund record in the merchant’s database.
Each transaction index is 32 bytes and so 4× 32 = 128 bytes are needed for the
four transactions ids (MainTC, RefundTC1, RefundTC2, and Redeem transac-
tion). Note that the merchant can always use a deterministic approach for the
child key indexes, for example always start from index 0 and increment it for
each new child key, and so they do not need to be stored. It is not difficult to
see that storage size is independent of the number of refundees.
Table 1. One refund record in the merchant’s database.
MainTC txid RefundTC1 txid RefundTC2 txid Redeem txid
32 bytes 32 bytes 32 bytes 32 bytes
In the case of a dispute, the merchant can retrieve all the mentioned trans-
actions from the blockchain using their stored transaction ids, and then use the
chain code, index, and the public key of the customer, to derive the related child
key, and use their own private key mi, i = 1, 2, to re-create the masked address,
Pk′′c = Pk
′
c + H
∗(miPk′c)P . If the output of the P2PKH transaction with ad-
dress Pk′′c is a spent output, it indicates that the customer has redeemed the
refund without the collaboration of the refundee. If the redeemed transaction is
the P2SH transaction, Pk′′c and the refund addresses in the Redeem transaction
are used to re-generate the P2SH address. If the address matches the RefundTC2
and it is a spent output we know that the owner of the masked child public key
Pk′′c (or more precisely the owner of the public key Pkc) and refundee have
collaborated with each other to redeem the refund.
Minimal storage size. In the following we compare the storage cost of our
proposed protocol with that of McCorry et al. [13]. The comparison summary
can be found in Table 2. In McCorry et al.’s solution, the proof of endorsement
is a signature that must be locally stored. Verification of this signature requires
information about the main transaction and the communicated messages includ-
ing the refund addresses, refund values, the memo from the customer, and the
payment request message. The merchant also needs to store the transaction ids
for both the payment and refund transactions. Let LS denote the size of the
proof of endorsement signature. The size of a transaction input with one signer
is at least 146 bytes 4. Other values are, refund address which is 34 bytes, refund
value which is 8 bytes, memo and payment request message sizes are denoted by
Lpay and can reach 50,000 bytes. Finally a transaction id is 32 bytes. Thus in
total, for one refundee, 252 + LS + Lpay bytes must be stored at the merchant
side and this cost grows linearly with the number of refundees. The total storage
for n refundees will be 210 + 42n+LS +Lpay bytes which is significantly higher
than our scheme. Note that we are not considering the size of the merchants’
keys in our calculations.
Table 2. Storage size (in bytes) of our approach vs. [13]
Scenario McCorry et al. [13] Our approach
1 refundee 252 + LS + Lpay 128
n refundees 210 + 42n+ LS + Lpay 128
Robustness. The payment protocol must work correctly in case of a dis-
pute or when the information stored in the merchant’s database is corrupted or
lost. In [13], if the local database that stores the signature (proof of endorse-
ment) is corrupted, the evidence of the collusion will be irreversibly lost and the
merchant will become vulnerable to refund attacks. In our proposed approach
however the merchant can exhaustively search on all their keys to retrieve the
database records. To do so, the merchant re-generates all the private/public keys
4 Previous transaction hash is 32 bytes, previous Tx-out index is 4 bytes, Tx-in script
length is 1-9 bytes, public key is 33 bytes in compressed format, signature is 72 bytes,
sequence number is 4 bytes.
using their wallet (through the master key) and then uses a blockchain explorer
(e.g. blockchain.info) to search for the transactions that contain these public
keys. We denote the search complexity on blockchain with OS . Assuming the
number of keys used by the merchant to be 2k, the search complexity becomes
2kOS . The retrieved transactions are then identified as MainTC, RefundTC1,
and RefundTC2 based on their types and the merchant role as a sender or re-
ceiver of each transaction. If the merchant is the recipient, the transaction is
MainTC. If the merchant is the sender and the transaction is P2SH, it is Re-
fundTC1, otherwise if the merchant is the sender and the transaction is P2PKH,
the transaction is RefundTC2. Redeem transactions are also found by searching
the output addresses in RefundTC1 and Refund TC2. If the number of these
transactions is ` the search complexity increases to 2k.`.OS . After this classifi-
cation, the merchant can follow the steps below to retrieve the database:
1. The merchant chooses one specific MainTC transaction and stores its index
in the database.
2. To find the related refund transactions, the merchant should reconstruct the
masked child key of the customer Pk′′c . First, merchant generates the child
key of the customer, Pk′c, using the chain code stored in MainTC (for the
index, merchant can always try the first index, i.e. pick index 0 and 1). Then,
they mask the child key with the Diffie-Hellman component, H(miPk
′
c)P to
generate Pk′′c . For this, the merchant should try all the private keys mi, for
1 ≤ i ≤ 2k.
– If Pk′′c matches the key inside RefundTC2, the used index is stored in
the database as RefundTC2 txid. If this transaction is a spent transac-
tion, merchant stores the corresponding Redeem transaction index in the
database and halts, since the proof is fully retrieved and customer have
spent the transaction alone.
– Otherwise, RefundTC1 may have been spent, so the merchant uses Pk′′c
to find the corresponding Redeem transaction and uses the refund keys
in that transaction to reconstruct the P2SH address. The corresponding
RefundTC1 is the one which contains the mentioned P2SH address. The
index of this transaction is stored in the database and the proof is fully
retrieved.
– However, if Redeem transaction for a specific customer does not exist
at all, it shows that customer has not redeemed the refund value yet,
hence the merchant should wait for the customer to claim the refund
and subsequently retrieve the database record.
The complexity of reconstruction depends on the number of keys the mer-
chant has used, the key generation, the search operation, and the number of
refund transactions. If key generation (calculating the point arithmetic and hash-
ing related to masked child key) takes OK , and the total number of customers is
t, then the total complexity is upper bounded by 2k(2tOK + `OS). The factor 2
for OK is because we should follow this procedure for both refund transactions
RefundTC1 and RefundTC2.
Privacy. To show that our scheme guarantees privacy, that is, only the
merchant and the customer can reveal the linkage between the customer and
the refundee, we consider two types of attackers: online attackers and offline
attackers. Since an online attacker has access to both the communication channel
and the blockchain, and hence is stronger, we only provide the justification for
privacy for an online attacker. Privacy against offline attackers who only have
access to the blockchain is straightforward.
Suppose that the channel is not TLS-protected (worst case), so the online
attacker can intercept all the communicated messages between the customer and
the merchant. Through PaymentRequest and Payment message, the attacker
discovers the public key of the merchant Pk∗m, the extended public key of the
customer (ch∗c , Pk
∗
c ) , and the public key of the refundee Pk
∗
r . The goal of the
attacker is to link the customer address Pk∗c in MainTC to the refund address
Pk∗r . For simplicity we assume that RefundTC1 and Redeem transaction is also
given to the attacker; this simulates the case where the refundee is the attacker.
In practice this assumption may not be true, and the attacker needs to also guess
the transactions. Overall, the attacker observes the information given in Table 3.
Table 3. View of an online attacker.
Information key source(s)
Extended public key of customer (ch∗c , Pk
∗
c ) MainTC
Public key of refundee Pk∗r Payment message, Redeem transaction
Public key of merchant Pk∗m1 RefundTC1
Public key of customer Pk′′c Redeem transaction
From Redeem transaction, the attacker can link the customer address Pk′′c
to Pk∗r . The reason is that to claim the bitcoins both the customer and the
refundee need to sign the Redeem transaction. Hence, a spent refund transaction
shows that the customer with Pk′′c knows the refundee with Pk
∗
r . Thus, to link
the customer Pk∗c to refundee Pk
∗
r , the attacker needs to just find whether Pk
′′
c
is derived from Pk∗c .
Pk′′c is generated as follows Pk
′′
c = Pk
′
c+H
∗(m∗1c
′P )P , where Pk′c is the child
key derived from the customer address Pk′c = Pk
∗
c +Hl(ch
∗
c , Pk
∗
c ||index)P . The
attacker knows Pk∗c and ch
∗
c , so they can guess Pk
′
c by trying different indexes
with probability 1n , assuming the number of refundees is n. To link the child key
Pk′c to Pk
′′
c , the attacker needs to solve the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem
(DDH) given m∗1c
′P , Pk∗m1 = m
∗
1P , and Pk
′
c = c
′P . Since solving DDH is
hard (say with  representing the probability of solving DDH), the attacker’s
probability of success will be Psuccess =

n which is negligible.
3.6 Multi-Signer Payment Transaction
In multi-signer transactions, MainTC has multiple inputs (multiple public keys
and signatures). This type of transactions is generated for example when a
number of bitcoin addresses jointly pay for a transaction. When a payment
transaction is created by multiple signers, endorsing the refund address by a
single signer has the danger of allowing them to steal the bitcoins or carry-
ing out a Silkroad Trader attack. McCorry et al.’s solution is resilient against
this attack because each key that is used in the payment transaction endorses
its own refund address. In our scheme however, the customer does not pro-
vide any signature before the refund, hence the merchant does not know which
refund address belongs to which signer in MainTC and blindly locks the bit-
coins to all of the signers. Although this solution prevents refund attacks, it
is not efficient in the sense that the refundee must interact with all of the
signers (that they may not know) to claim the refund. We use the refund to
field in the payment message; if there are ` customers with public keys Pkc1 ,
Pkc2 ,...,Pkc` and n refund addresses as Pkr1 , Pkr2 , ..., Pkrn , the refund to field
will be {(Pkc1 , Pkr1 , v1), (Pkc2 , Pkr2 , v2), ...}. This binding is authenticated later
in our protocol, meaning that if customer approves to sign the redeem transac-
tion, the refundee’s address is correct, and so no signature is needed at this
stage.
We review possible attacks after introducing this modification. In the Silkroad
Trader attack, the customer may modify the Payment.refund to field and insert
the Silkroad Trader address as a refund address of another signer. Since the mer-
chant will lock the refund transaction to the victim co-signer, the refund cannot
be claimed by the Silkroad Trader since the victim co-signer does not collab-
orate with the unknown Silkraod Trader. The co-signer can claim the refund
on their own through the second transaction (i.e. the P2SH transaction) issued
for them by the merchant. In the Marketplace Trader attack, a co-signer may
intend to change the refund addresses after the payment is finalized to steal the
bitcoins. In this case, the co-signer will present a new refund address for each
key used in the payment transaction. Again the merchant locks the bitcoins to
the main customer and the new refundee and so the bitcoins will stay locked
since the attacker cannot obtain the signature of the customer on that transac-
tion. Furthermore, the customer can redeem the refund from the second issued
transaction (i.e. the P2SH transaction). Note that
1. A co-signer cannot change the value of refund through email. If the value is
changed, the merchant will lock the bitcoins to all of the customers to ensure
that they know about the change.
2. When the payment transaction is a multi-signature transaction, each of the
signers who has authorized the payment transaction must include at least
one refund address. Even if two parties agree on one refund address, both
must include it and the merchant must lock the refund to both of them
through a 3-of-3 multi-signature output (or n-of-n if the number of them
is n − 1). If a signer fails to include a refund address, the Silkroad Trader
attack becomes probable.
4 Bitcoin User Anonymity Using Refund Mechanism
Despite using pseudonym for senders and receivers of transaction, it has been
shown that transactions can be linked [2,15,16] and combined with other data
possibly reveal user identities. There have been a number of approaches for
providing anonymity [17,11,12,3]. Stealth address schemes [17] guarantee address
anonymity against an online attacker who intercepts the communication link
and sees the Bitcoin address of the payee when it is sent to payer to create the
transaction. By stealth address technique, payer adds a Diffie-Hellman key to
the payee’s address in a way that the corresponding private key is still known by
payee. In CoinSwap [12] a party uses an intermediary node to send the payment
to payee; the goal is anonymity against online attacker. In CoinJoin [11] a number
of parties agree to create one transaction together, they also use values with equal
worth to provide value anonymity against an offline attacker. In Fair Exchange
[3] two people exchange their bitcoins with each other to achieve coins with a
history that is unrelated to them, to resist against an offline attacker. Each of
these solutions can be considered as a traditional mixing service. Users can also
mix their coins through a mix server (e.g. bitmixer.io [5]), which receives their
coins and pay them back a fresh coin, although mixer receives a fee from the
user. This technique, however has a problem, user should trust the mix server
that they will not steal their money.
Refund mechanism provides a level of indirection that can be used for adding
anonymity to Bitcoin users. We propose to use merchants as a trusted mixing
servers by using a modified BIP70 protocol refund’s policy. To use this service,
the customer visits the website of a merchant and selects an item for purchase.
By using overpayment and the recipients’ addresses as the refund addresses,
the sender can send payment to refundees in an anonymous way. Alternatively,
they can send the desired amount to the merchant and later cancel their order
for the refund. In these situations, merchant acts as an intermediary to allow
the customer to pay the bitcoins to the recipients indirectly. Merchant can also
split the value to smaller chunks and mix the refund transactions of different
entities to provide value and time anonymity respectively. Reputable merchants
are generally trusted and are expected to follow the protocol. Note that the
merchant does not know if the refundee in a refund transaction is a customer
and cannot relate the output bitcoin addresses to the user. Merchants can benefit
for such service by requesting a fee for it.
In our proposed protocol, the merchant receives inputs from customers’
transaction, and issues transaction with outputs based on the addresses in the
Payment.refund to field. Refund addresses are extended public keys of refun-
dees. Merchant generates child keys of the respective refund addresses, split the
values of refund to smaller equal chunks and sends the partitioned values to
child keys. Merchant considers the refund address as a parent key and uses its
child keys for refund transactions to have a fresh address for each chunk. To
provide confidentiality for the parent refund key (this is needed because we as-
sume online attacker exists and the communication is HTTP), the merchant
encrypts the child keys using the Diffie-Hellman key generated by the public key
of the merchant and the private key of the customer. For secure mixing, the time
relationship between the input and the output of the mix must be protected.
Otherwise an adversary who intercepts the merchant’s channel can link the two
using the time information of the merchant input and output. In the following
protocol the merchant mixes the refunds of different customers and hides the
time relation between inputs and outputs of the mix service.
Key generation. We assume that Refundee is using BIP32 [18] wallets, and
sends their extended public key to the customer. Customer generates a pri-
vate/public key pair as Pkc = cP .
Click to pay. The customer visits the merchant website and chooses an item,
then clicks on “pay”.
Payment request. The merchant sends the payment request message includ-
ing their public key, Pkm = mP . This public key is unique for each trans-
action.
Payment message. After authenticating the merchant, the customer picks a
public key, Pkc, and generates MainTC which pays the cost of the chosen
item to Merchant. Then, the customer creates a payment message with ex-
tended refund keys, (Pkri , chri),∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, for n refund addresses, and
the amount of refund value for each; then encrypts the Payment.refund to
field using Diffie-Hellman key H∗(cPkm) (this is not required if channel is
TLS-protected).
Payment ack. The merchant detects MainTC, decrypts the refund addresses,
and returns an acknowledgement message, PaymentAck, to customer.
Refund request. Within a predetermined distance from payment request (can
be defined in Payment.refund to field), customer can use the addresses pro-
vided in refund to field to receive the refund. In this case, the merchant
1. Splits each refund value (for different customers) to k partition; for ex-
ample, v1 is divided to v11, v12, . . . v1k, and v2 to v21, v22, . . . v2k and
so on. The goal is to have equal amounts.
2. Derives child keys of each refund address, Pk′rij ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, and ∀1 ≤
j ≤ k.
3. Creates a few transactions. For each child key merchant creates an output
that pays its chunk of refund value to the corresponding masked child
key Pk′′rij = Pk
′
rij + H
∗(m∗Pk′rij ), ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, and ∀1 ≤ j ≤ k.
While mixing the outputs of different customers in each transaction, the
merchant broadcasts the transactions to the Bictoin network.
4.1 Discussion
Our approach is relatively similar to CoinJoin [11]. CoinJoin has two versions;
in the first version users should agree and join to create one transaction. Be-
cause this co-joined transaction mixes inputs and outputs of different users, an
offline attacker can not distinguish the relation between them, provided that the
inputs are all in the same range. In the second version of CoinJoin, users trust
a third party who mixes the input and outputs of different users and create one
transaction, and sends it back to each user to sign. In this procedure, the third
party learns the relation between inputs and outputs and IP addresses of the
users. This approach cannot protect against online attackers who intercept the
communication channels. To hide the IP address from online attackers, Tor or
VPN must be used [11].
In our scheme, customers start a normal purchase from a merchant, and
send the excess transferred amount, or alternatively the whole payment, to the
refundee through merchant. First of all, it should be noted that refund request
can be sent via a different communication channel such as email (by providing
payment acknowledgment), so an online attacker is not able to see the refund
request. Second, an online attacker can never be assured that the customers have
really made a purchase or not, or even which item they have bought, since it is
possible to make overpayments to hide the exact amount of payment. Third, in
CoinJoin the final transaction consists of output addresses who have been intro-
duced by the owner of input addresses, meaning that everyone knows that the
output address has a relation with one of the inputs (possibly ownership), and
even the values in the input and output can leak information about the links
between input and output addresses. In our scheme the merchant creates the
refund transaction using a different address from the one used in the MainTC,
and so the link between the customer’s first transaction (MainTC) and the re-
fund transaction (RefundTC) is removed. Additionally, any relation between the
inputs and outputs in the sense of time, value, and address are taken off and a
global passive attacker who monitors communication links and the blockchain
cannot obtain any information (see Figure 5). Fourth, merchants will not be
able to steal the bitcoins of the customers because of their reputation. This fea-
ture is necessary for any indirect payment; in CoinSwap [12], which is also an
indirect payment method, first a commitment transaction is created to impede
theft and then the transfer is done. But in our scheme even if the merchant does
not deliver the bitcoins to the refundee, the customer can present their payment
acknowledgement message to a judge and prove the theft. Effectively, using the
merchant as a mixing server extends the search space for linking transactions
and ensures a higher anonymity compared to CoinJoin.
Fig. 5. Alice wants to send 0.4Bto Carol and Elena, and Bob 0.5Bto David and Frank.
Alice pays the bitcoins to merchant, and introduces Carol and Elena as refundees,
through BIP70. Bob also pays the bitcoins to merchant and introduces David as re-
fundee. Merchant creates a few refund transactions and mixed their outputs and send
them to refundees.
5 Concluding Remarks
We proposed a new approach to mitigate Refund attacks against BIP70 using
implicit logging which requires the merchant to only store indexes of four trans-
actions for each run of the protocol. Our approach provides a solution that is ro-
bust against possible corruption of the merchant’s local database, and preserves
the privacy of the refund (i.e. the link between the customer and the refundee).
We also showed that refund mechanism can be used to provide anonymity for
payers and payees, through merchant acting as a mix server, and provided the
communication protocol between the customer and the mixing service based on
BIP70. This is a novel approach for providing anonymity for bitcoin transac-
tion that need careful evaluation. This will be an interesting direction for future
work.
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A An anonymous BIP70 secure against Refund attacks
In this section, we aggregate the schemes in previous sections to have a unique
scheme which is resilient against Refund attacks [13] and an offline attacker
against anonymity of users.
Key generation. Customer and refundees wallet software generates a tree of
public/private key pairs using BIP32 [18].
Click to pay. Customer visits the merchant website and chooses an item, then
clicks on ”pay”.
Payment request. Merchant sends the payment request message including
their public key, Pkm = mP . This public key is unique for each transac-
tion.
Payment message. After authenticating and authorizing the merchant, cus-
tomer chooses one of the non-hardened extended public keys, (Pkc, chc),
and generates MainTC ; this transaction sends the cost of the chosen item to
Merchant. The chain code of customer is also stored as a data in MainTC.
Then, customer creates a payment message based on MainTC. In payment
message customer determines a few refund addresses which are extended
public keys of refundees, ((Pkr1 , chr1), (Pkr2 , chr2), . . . , (Pkrk , chrn)), for n
refundees, and the amount of bitcoins each address should receive in case of
canceling the order or overpayment.
Payment ack. Merchant detects MainTC and returns an acknowledgement
message to customer.
Refund request. Within a predetermined distance from payment request, cus-
tomer can use the addresses provided in Payment.refund to field to receive
the refund. In this case, merchant,
1. Splits each refund value (for different customers) to k partition, for ex-
ample, v1 is divided to v11, v12, . . . v1k, and v2 to v21, v22, . . . v2k, and
so on.
2. Derives child refund keys Pk′rij , ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, where n is the number of
refundees, and ∀1 ≤ j ≤ k.
3. Derives child keys of customers Pk′cij ,∀1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1 and ∀1 ≤ j ≤ k,
according to the number of refundees n each customer has.
4. Generates refund transactions: In RefundTC1 each output (a refund
chunk) is locked to a child key of refundee and customer, whereas in Re-
fundTC2, at each output, the refund chunk is just locked to the child key
of customer. Each child key is masked using the private key of merchant
related to that transaction. For example if the merchant public key is
Pkm = m
∗P , the child key of customer is Pk′c = c
′P , then the masked
child key of customer will be Pk′′c = Pk
′
c +Hl(m
∗Pk′c)P .
5. While mixing the outputs of multiple customers in each transaction
Broadcasts the them to Bitcoin network.
